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view seems to me to give even deeper meaning to Hegel's words that the punishment is the criminal's right, and an honor as well as a disgrace, while it also makes more evident the necessity of the element of pain.

It is significant, I think, that in the period of history where punishment has perhaps been most effective as a moral agent, the period of the Church's rule in the Middle Ages, it has borne the character of penance. It seems, moreover, not impossible that what is sometimes taken to be "vindictive pleasure" may be the result of a dimly-felt conviction that it is only through suffering that the criminal can be rescued. I may add that I do not consider this disciplinary and penitential view of punishment applicable in all cases,—obviously it can only be in place where there has been actual sin,—and I agree with Mr. McTaggart in thinking that punishment is needed in other cases, and can be justified on other grounds.

I should like to add one word on the question of corporal punishment. No doubt its opponents deliver themselves of much sentimental nonsense, but they have solid reasons as well. Boys, it may be granted, for the most part take corporal chastisement simply as one, and not the unpleasitest, form of punishment. The average boy would choose to "have his time caned off" rather than to be kept in. But it is both true and important, I think, that corporal punishment is of all forms the most liable to be given and received as a *deterrent*. It is here the danger lies. For girls, at least, and sensitive-natured boys the thought that they are treated "like dogs to whom the master shows a whip" is galling in the extreme. The treatment is apt to make them hardened, cynical, scornful of legitimate authority. In such cases I think it may be fairly said that it does tend to produce degradation.

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THE TRANSLATION OF "SITTLICH."

PROFESSOR DYDE's recent translation of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" suggests the question with regard to the best way of rendering *sittlich* and its corresponding substantives. Mr. Dyde apparently adopts "ethical" as the equivalent; but this is evidently in some respects objectionable. The term "Ethics" is best used for the *science* of morals, and an "ethical system" is best under-

stood as meaning a body of moral theory, not a set of moral habits. *Sittlich* is probably untranslatable; but, as we are very much in want of some way of rendering the meaning into English, it occurs to me to ask why the good old word "manners" should not be restored to something of its old dignity in ethical literature. This term was not always restricted to the "minor morals." It is not so, for instance, in the following passages from Addison and Bacon: "His princes are as much distinguished by their manners as by their dominions; and even those among them whose characters seem wholly made up of courage, differ from one another as to the particular kinds." "The kinds of music have most operation upon manners; as to make them warlike; to make them soft and effeminate." It seems clear that in both these cases "manners" would be rendered in German by "sittlich." And even in much more recent times Wordsworth could, without offence, express in his sonnet to Milton the devout aspiration, "Give us manners, virtue, freedom, power,"—i.e., give us $\eta\thetaος$, or *sitten*. So also with the corresponding adjectives. When Macbeth speaks of "the murderers steeped in the colours of their trade, their daggers unmanly breeched with gore," it is clear that he means *unsittlich*. And when Julia, in "The Two Gentlemen of Verona," says, "Let me have what thou think'st meet and is most mannerly," it is equally clear that she means *sittlich*. Similarly, take such expressions as these: "Others out of mannerliness and respect to God;" "By whatever mannerly names we may palliate the offence;" "Barefaced ribaldry is both unmanly in itself and fulsome to the reader."* In such examples the terms "manners," "mannerly," and "unmannerly" seem to approach very closely in their meaning to the German *sitten*, *sittlich*, and *unsittlich*. Why should not this usage be restored? Of course, I do not mean to suggest that "manners" could ever become a satisfactory equivalent for *sitten*. But sometimes, at least, it might serve.

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* Several of these instances are taken from Johnson's Dictionary.